Is There Life After Concepcion? State Courts, State Law, and the Mandate of Arbitration by Wolff, Michael A.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 56 
Number 4 Justice Systems Circa 2011: Public 
Courts, Military Commissions and Aggregate 
Processing (Summer 2012) 
Article 11 
2012 
Is There Life After Concepcion? State Courts, State Law, and the 
Mandate of Arbitration 
Michael A. Wolff 
Saint Louis University School of Law, mwolff3@slu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael A. Wolff, Is There Life After Concepcion? State Courts, State Law, and the Mandate of Arbitration, 
56 St. Louis U. L.J. (2012). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol56/iss4/11 
This Childress Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
1269 
IS THERE LIFE AFTER CONCEPCION? 
STATE COURTS, STATE LAW, AND THE MANDATE OF 
ARBITRATION 
MICHAEL A. WOLFF* 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”)1 in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion sets up a tension between 
federal authority, expressed as preemption, and state law of contracts, which is 
largely shaped by the common law judges of the states’ appellate courts.2  The 
question Concepcion presents for state courts is whether all provisions in 
consumer contracts that bar a consumer from being a class-action plaintiff and 
require arbitration are valid or whether a court may invalidate provisions on a 
case-by-case basis, particularly where they deprive the consumer of a remedy,3 
a matter of concern under the constitutions of many states.4 
Section two of the FAA says that an arbitration provision “shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”5  Concepcion holds that the FAA 
preempts state contract-law concepts that would frustrate arbitration; it 
federalizes the principle of section two, at least to an extent.6 
 
* The author, former judge of the Supreme Court of Missouri, is Professor of Law and Co-
Director of the Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Law at Saint Louis University School of 
Law.  The research assistance of Alicia Ragsdale, 2L, is gratefully acknowledged. 
 1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 2. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–48, 1753 (2011). 
 3. Id. at 1744, 1746; see also id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that in 
circumstances similar to the Concepcions’ case, “non-class arbitration . . . will . . . sometimes 
have the effect of depriving claimants of their claims”). 
 4. See, e.g., Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P., 854 So. 2d 529, 538 (Ala. 2002) (holding 
the arbitration clause, which precluded class-action treatment of a dispute, was unconscionable 
and unenforceable because “[t]he public policy of Alabama as articulated by § 13 of the 
Constitution of Alabama of 1901 guarantees that ‘every person, for any injury done to him, . . . 
shall have a remedy by due process of law’”). 
 5. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 6. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.  I start with the proposition that Justice Scalia’s 
opinion is law, despite the “reluctant” fifth vote from Justice Thomas, id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., 
concurring), which seems to have invented a new kind of separate opinion—the reluctant 
concurrence. 
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As is all too common with decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the reader must examine more than one opinion in a 5-4 decision to 
discern what is law.  Justice Scalia’s principal opinion, which is a majority 
opinion, should be read with Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in order to 
discern what propositions are wholly supported by a majority of the Court.7  
These propositions, at a minimum, are: 
1) The FAA does not permit a state to find an arbitration agreement 
unconscionable solely because the agreement has a class action 
waiver;8 
2) The FAA does not otherwise preempt traditional state law defenses to 
contract formation.9 
While there remains a question of whether Concepcion leaves open a case-
by-case determination of whether there are state-law precepts that invalidate 
company-friendly arbitration provisions,10 the question ultimately may be more 
important for federal courts applying state law than for state courts because 
many class actions filed in state courts will be removed to federal court under 
the Class Action Fairness Act.11 
A careful reading of Concepcion is in order for post-Concepcion cases, 
whether in state courts or in federal courts applying state contract law.  The 
Concepcion plaintiffs sued AT&T Mobility alleging that they were improperly 
charged sales tax on the retail value of cell phones that they received for “free” 
upon the signing of their service contract.12  The original suit in federal court 
was consolidated with a class action alleging that AT&T Mobility engaged in 
fraud and false advertising in charging sales tax on phones the company had 
 
 7. See United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(examining a Supreme Court plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to determine 
the rule that lower courts should follow); Jacobsen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 993 F.2d 649, 655 n.2 
(9th Cir. 1992) (counting votes to consider whether “the Supreme Court would have five votes for 
holding a post office is a nonpublic forum” and whether such a determination would apply to 
airports as well); Tristan C. Pelham-Webb, Powelling for Precedent: “Binding” Concurrences, 
64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 693, 695–96, 698–99 (2009); James F. Spriggs II & David R. 
Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 520 (2011). 
 8. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (“Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration 
interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with 
the FAA.”). 
 9. Id. (“§ 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses . . . .”); id. at 
1753 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As I would read it, the FAA requires that an agreement to 
arbitrate be enforced unless a party successfully challenges the formation of the arbitration 
agreement, such as by proving fraud or duress.”). 
 10. See id. at 1748 (plurality opinion) (making a narrow assertion that a state rule will be 
displaced if it “stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives”). 
 11. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1453(b) (2006) (expanding federal courts’ jurisdiction in 
class actions). 
 12. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
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advertised as free.13  Despite the district court’s conclusion that the arbitration 
remedy was “‘quick, easy to use’ and likely to ‘promp[t] full or . . . even 
excess payment to the customer,” the district court held the arbitration 
provision unconscionable under California law based on the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.14 
Discover Bank held that a class-action waiver in a consumer contract is 
unconscionable where consumer claims are small and the plaintiff alleges a 
scheme to cheat consumers.15  The defect of Discover Bank is that it required 
courts to strike down arbitration provisions with class-action waivers without 
regard to whether the provision was otherwise unconscionable or, indeed, 
whether the consumer was worse off without arbitration.16  The district court in 
Concepcion had concluded that individual arbitration would be more beneficial 
to a consumer than being a participant in a class action.17  Under California’s 
Discover Bank principle, class-action waivers are rarely enforced;18 this 
prompted the Supreme Court’s holding that the FAA preempts California law 
because Discover Bank “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”19 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, as reinforced by the fifth vote of Justice Thomas, 
acknowledges that section two of the FAA “permits agreements to arbitrate to 
be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, 
or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that 
derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”20 
Justice Thomas’s opinion is slightly narrower than Justice Scalia’s 
majority, so the majority opinion should be read as being informed by the 
reasoning of the Thomas opinion.  To do otherwise is to ignore the separately 
expressed views of one-fifth of the Court’s majority.  Justice Thomas focuses 
on the language of section two’s saving clause that refers only to defenses that 
result in “revocation” of a contract21—not the broader language of Justice 
Scalia that refers also to “invalidation” or “nonenforcement” of a contract.22  
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1745 (alteration in original); Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS 
(AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *9, *11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), rev’d AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 15. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 16. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746, 1750. 
 17. Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *11–12; see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (citing 
Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *11–12). 
 18. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (finding California’s Discover Bank was “frequently 
applied . . . to find arbitration agreements unconscionable”). 
 19. Id. at 1753 (citation omitted). 
 20. Id. at 1746 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
 21. Id. at 1754–55 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 22. Compare id. at 1746 (plurality opinion), with id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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The FAA, Justice Thomas says, requires “enforcement of an agreement to 
arbitrate unless a party successfully asserts a defense concerning the formation 
of the agreement . . . .”23  By contrast, “[c]ontract defenses unrelated to the 
making of the agreement—such as public policy,” which was the basis for the 
Discover Bank principle, “could not be the basis for declining to enforce an 
arbitration clause.”24 
In analyzing Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas’s opinions, the reader can 
discern that the FAA, as applied in Concepcion, requires an individualized 
examination of the arbitration provision at issue because a state-law defense is 
preempted only when the defense “stand[s] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”25  In each case, therefore, the court 
must review the terms and the circumstances of the formation of the contract to 
determine whether they render the provision invalid due to fraud, duress, 
unconscionability, or another defense to the formation of the contract.26 
As an aside, I note that among some teachers of contract law, 
unconscionability is not particularly fashionable because it is a doctrine that is 
sometimes invoked to rescue the weak from the strong.27  Contracts of 
adhesion are also dealt with derisively; for example, consider Justice Scalia’s 
observation that “the times in which consumer contracts were anything other 
than adhesive are long past.”28  One might ask whether Justice Scalia is 
speaking as a common law judge, and if so, whose common law is he talking 
about?  One possibility—not acknowledged by post-Concepcion courts or 
commentators—is that the Concepcion opinion is opening the way to displace 
state law entirely and making the “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract”29 a question of federal common law, in the way 
that federal labor law has preempted state employment law and caused courts 
to develop a federal common law on the subject.30 
The Scalia opinion, however, seems to eschew that kind of sweeping 
change; in a footnote the opinion says,  “Of course States remain free to take 
 
 23. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1755 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1748 (plurality opinion). 
 26. See id. at 1746; id. at 1754–55 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 27. See, e.g., Susan A. FitzGibbon, Teaching Unconscionability Through Agreements to 
Arbitrate Employment Claims, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1401, 1405–06 (2000) (describing 
unconscionability analysis as “an imprecise process” that takes into consideration the “disparity 
of bargaining power between the parties”). 
 28. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.  Common law aside, Missouri’s Uniform Arbitration 
Act specifically precludes enforcement of contracts of adhesion.  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 435.350 
(2000); see also State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Mo. 2006) (“An 
arbitration clause in a contract of adhesion is not enforceable, pursuant to section 435.350.”). 
 29. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
 30. Timothy A. Kelley, Labor Law Gap-Filling: Federal Common Law Ideals Versus 
Litigation Realities, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 438 & n.5 (2011). 
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steps addressing the concerns that attend contracts of adhesion—for example, 
requiring class-action-waiver provisions in adhesive arbitration agreements to 
be highlighted.”31  But, he adds, “[s]uch steps cannot . . . conflict with the FAA 
or frustrate its purpose to ensure that private arbitration agreements are 
enforced according to their terms.”32 
The doctrine of unconscionability is well anchored in state law, derided or 
not, and is summarized in section 208 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts: 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made 
a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of 
any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.33 
In assessing the question of unconscionability, a lynchpin, at least for some 
state judges, is whether it appears from the language of the contract that the 
provision would foreclose the consumer from any effective remedy or whether 
there would be a remedy available.34  The role preserved for state courts 
interpreting state law is subject to the constitutional mandate that there be a 
remedy for every legal wrong, a mandate found in the constitutions of most 
states, but not in the United States Constitution.35  Article one, section fourteen 
of the Missouri Constitution provides, for example, “[t]hat the courts of justice 
shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to 
person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered 
without sale, denial or delay.”36 
So the question for a state court is whether the arbitration provision, with 
the class-action waiver, denies the opportunity for a just resolution of a 
consumer dispute by foreclosing a remedy.  Under Concepcion, this does not 
invite an inquiry as to whether the application of the contract denies a remedy 
as a practical matter; the focus is on the formation of the contract.37 
 
 31. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 n.6. 
 32. Id. 
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 34. See, e.g., Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P., 854 So. 2d 529, 538–39 (Ala. 2002). 
 35. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 431 (4th 
ed. 2006); David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.25 (1992) 
(documenting the thirty-nine states that had a constitutional right-to-a-remedy clause as of 1992). 
 36. MO. CONST. art. I, § 14; see also Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 546 (Mo. 2000) 
(finding that a statutory restriction requiring a liquor licensee’s conviction in order to maintain a 
civil dram shop action violated the “open courts” provision of the Missouri Constitution). 
 37. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1755 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Missouri law is consistent 
with the description of unconscionability in a case cited by Justice Thomas in Concepcion, id. at 
1755, Hume v. United States: 
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Missouri courts have evaluated unconscionability38 on a case-by-case 
basis.  If the arbitration agreement in the Concepcion case were evaluated in 
the Missouri courts, the agreement would not be determined to be 
unconscionable because, in view of the trial court’s findings, it appears to 
provide a speedy remedy for the consumer disputes.39  If the company pays for 
the arbitration, and, in the event the customer prevails and is awarded more 
than the defendant’s last settlement offer, provides a minimum of $7,500 and 
twice the attorney’s fees incurred, there is a remedy.  Those are the 
Concepcion facts, as the district court found them.40 
Missouri’s common law of unconscionability has two aspects: procedural 
unconscionability, which relates to the circumstances of the formation of the 
contract, and substantive unconscionability, which relates to the provisions of 
the contract itself.41  “[U]nconscionability can be procedural, substantive[,] or 
a combination of both.  There is no need in all cases to show both aspects of 
 
  In his celebrated judgment in Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 
Lord Hardwicke arranged all the forms of fraud, recognized by equity, in four classes, the 
first two of which he gives in these words 
  “1. Then fraud, which is dolus malus, may be actual, arising from facts and 
circumstances of imposition, which is the plainest case.  2. It may be apparent from the 
intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself, such as no man in his senses and not 
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept 
on the other; which are unequitable and unconscientious bargains, and of such even the 
common law has taken notice, for which, if it would not look a little ludicrous, might be 
cited James v. Morgan, 1 Lev 111.” 
132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889).  “And there may be contracts so extortionate and unconscionable on 
their face as to raise the presumption of fraud in their inception, or at least to require but slight 
additional evidence to justify such presumption.”  Id. at 414. 
 38. “Unconscionable” is “‘an inequality so strong, gross, and manifest that it must be 
impossible to state it to one with common sense without producing an exclamation at the 
inequality of it.’”  Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Div. of Aging v. Brookside Nursing Ctr., Inc., 50 
S.W.3d 273, 277 (Mo. 2001) (quoting Peirick v. Peirick, 641 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1982)).  An unconscionable contract has been defined as “an agreement ‘such as no man in his 
senses and not under delusion would make, on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would 
accept on the other.’”  Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) 
(quoting Hume, 132 U.S. at 415). 
 39. See MO. CONST. art. I, § 14 (guaranteeing the right to a remedy without “delay”); 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (agreeing with the district court’s assertion that the Concepcions 
were “better off” under the AT&T arbitration agreement since a class action “could take months, 
if not years”); see also Swain, 128 S.W.3d at 107 (“Because the bulk of contracts signed in this 
country are form contracts . . . any rule automatically invalidating adhesion contracts would be 
‘completely unworkable.’  Rather, our courts seek to enforce the reasonable expectations of the 
parties.  Only those provisions that fail to comport with those reasonable expectations and are 
unexpected and unconscionably unfair are unenforceable.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 40. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 41. State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006). 
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unconscionability.”42  Missouri cases will hold a contract to be substantively 
unconscionable where the provision is so one-sided that it holds one party 
immune from liability as a practical matter.43 
There seems little doubt that, as described in Justice Scalia’s opinion and 
as found by the district court, the arbitration provision would not be 
substantively unconscionable because the consumer has not just a remedy, but 
an apparently better remedy than he or she would have in a class action.44 
More significant than measuring the Concepcion provision under Missouri 
law is the larger point that Missouri law is not hostile to mandatory 
arbitration.45  That has not always been the case; Missouri, like most states, 
initially was reluctant to enforce the FAA.46  This reluctance led the 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to promulgate the Uniform Arbitration 
Act, which eventually was adopted in Missouri in 1980.47 
Prior to the enactment of the Missouri arbitration statute, Missouri courts 
did not enforce arbitration provisions;48 however, after the state law took 
 
 42. Ruhl v. Lee’s Summit Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136, 139 n.2 (Mo. 2010). 
 43. Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 340 S.W.3d 126, 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2011) (Ahuja, J., concurring).  For cases supporting this point and summarizing Missouri cases on 
substantive unconscionability, see id. at 138 n.2 (citing Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc., 323 
S.W.3d 18, 24 (Mo. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011); Ruhl v. Lee’s Summit Honda, 322 
S.W.3d 136, 140 (Mo. 2010); Shaffer v. Royal Gate Dodge, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 556, 559–60 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2009); Woods v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Whitney 
v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 44. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 45. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Sherfield, 895 S.W.2d 169, 173–74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 46. See Traci L. Jones, State Law of Contract Formation in the Shadow of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 46 DUKE L.J. 651, 652, 656 (1996). 
 47. See G. William Quatman, Missouri Arbitration Law Part I: The Uniform and Federal 
Arbitration Act, 52 J. Mo. B. 78, 78 (1996).  Missouri Arbitration Law Part I: The Uniform and 
Federal Arbitration Acts summarizes the history of the acts in Missouri: 
  Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925 to change the 
common law rule, held in Missouri and other states, that an executory agreement to 
arbitrate, as distinguished from an agreement to submit a particular dispute to arbitration, 
was unenforceable.  The FAA was intended to reverse centuries of hostility to arbitration 
agreements by placing arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts. 
  Thirty years after passage of the FAA, states began to rewrite arbitration law along 
the lines of the federal model.  To promote uniformity in enforcement and interpretation 
of arbitration agreements, the Uniform Arbitration Act was drafted in 1955.  The Uniform 
Act has since been adopted by 34 states, including Missouri, which adopted it in 1980.  
The Missouri act applies to contracts made after August 13, 1980.  Before Missouri’s 
adoption of the Uniform Act, arbitration clauses were not fully enforceable in this state.  
Since adoption of the Uniform Act, however, written agreements to arbitrate are valid and 
enforceable under both state and federal law. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 48. Id. 
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effect, Missouri law was held to encourage arbitration.49  But when Missouri 
enacted the arbitration statute it put in requirements that are not in the federal 
law—a provision that excluded contracts of adhesion and a provision that 
required a contract to state, in ten-point capital letters, “THIS CONTRACT 
CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION WHICH MAY BE 
ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES.”50 
However much the legislature may have wished to exclude adhesion 
contracts and to require notice to signers of contracts, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri held unequivocally in 1985 that, where the FAA applied, the federal 
law preempted the state statute’s requirements because the Act was one 
affecting interstate commerce.51  “Any requirement of state law which adds a 
burden not imposed by Congress is in derogation of the Congressional power, 
and pro tanto invalid.”52  The Missouri court’s holding is based on the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating.53  In Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, 
dissented on the basis that “the Federal Arbitration Act . . . does not apply in 
state courts” and that the Southland decision should be overturned.54  For his 
part, Justice Scalia in a separate dissent said he no longer dissented on the basis 
that Southland should be overturned, but if there were four justices prepared to 
do so, he would give them the fifth vote.55 
This leads, perhaps a bit awkwardly, to discerning the meaning of Justice 
Thomas’s fifth vote in Concepcion, whose “reluctant” concurrence seems to 
have the effect of simultaneously endorsing the majority’s interpretation and 
limiting it.  An extreme interpretation is that the 5–4 holding of Concepcion—
that California’s Discover Bank rule stands as an obstacle to the purposes of 
the FAA and is thus preempted56—may be limited to cases that arise in federal 
courts, as Concepcion did.57  Had the issue in Concepcion reached the United 
States Supreme Court from a state court, there may not have been five votes 
for preemption.  In his dissent in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
Justice Thomas insisted that the FAA in general, including section two of the 
 
 49. Greenwood, 895 S.W.2d at 173. 
 50. Compare MO. REV. STAT. §§ 435.350, 435.460 (2000), with 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 51. Bunge Corp. v. Perryville Feed & Produce, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Mo. 1985). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) for the rule that a state statute 
cannot “bar an arbitration remedy under a contract which is within the coverage of the Federal 
Arbitration Act”). 
 54. 513 U.S. 265, 285–86, 295 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 56. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 57. See infra notes 58–63 and accompanying text (describing Justice Thomas’s opinion, as 
expressed in several cases prior to Concepcion, that the FAA is applicable to federal courts only). 
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Act in particular, simply “does not apply in state courts.”58  In Allied-Bruce, 
the Court held that the FAA preempted a state law “making written, predispute 
arbitration agreements invalid and ‘unenforceable.’”59  Justice Thomas 
explained that “[a]t the time of the FAA’s passage in 1925, laws governing the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements were generally thought to deal purely 
with matters of procedure rather than substance,” and as such “[i]t would have 
been extraordinary for Congress to attempt to prescribe procedural rules for 
state courts.”60  To the contrary, as the 1925 Congress understood matters, 
“state arbitration statutes prescribed rules for the state courts, and the FAA 
prescribed rules for the federal courts.”61  In the view of Justice Thomas, this 
federal-court limitation on the FAA applies to section two because the text of 
the statute as a whole “makes clear that § 2 was not meant as a statement of 
substantive law binding on the States” but is instead “a purely procedural 
provision.”62  Justice Thomas reiterated this view in four more cases after 
Allied-Bruce.63 
The Court in Concepcion of course had no occasion to consider the extent 
to which its holding applied in state-court proceedings.  When the Court makes 
a “judicial pronouncement,” that pronouncement’s value comes from “the 
settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards 
the plaintiff.”64  Put another way, the Concepcion decision may be understood 
as a pronouncement that extends only to the context of the particular case—a 
case litigated in federal court.  Justice Scalia’s pronouncement that the 
“Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA”65 perhaps should be interpreted 
to mean only that the Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA in federal 
court. 
But, because Justice Thomas does not refer to his previous position that 
preemption does not apply to state courts,66 he may simply have moved on 
from his earlier position, especially in light of the “Class Action Fairness Act 
 
 58. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285–86 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 269, 281–82 (majority opinion). 
 60. Id. at 286–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 289. 
 62. Id. at 291. 
 63. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Green Tree Fin. 
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 460 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 64. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987). 
 65. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 66. See id. at 1753–56 (Thomas, J., concurring) (failing to argue that section two does not 
apply to state courts). 
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of 2005,”67 in which Congress made many class actions removable from state 
to federal court.68 
The Act’s “Findings and Purposes” show a clear intent to allow class-
action defendants to opt out of state courts because, among other things, state 
and local courts “sometimes act[] in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-
State defendants . . . .”69  The Act provides diversity of citizenship in 
“interstate cases of national importance,”70 specifically a minimal kind of 
diversity jurisdiction: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which 
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of 
interest and costs, and is a class action in which— 
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any 
defendant; 
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject 
of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or 
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant 
is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.71 
The jurisdictional provisions allow, or occasionally require, a district court 
to decline jurisdiction in a number of circumstances that indicate that the 
action was more local than national in its scope or applicable law.72 
The purpose of the Class Action Fairness Act, as evident from the 
expressed congressional intent, is to allow most large consumer class actions to 
be removed to federal court.73 
If Justice Thomas’s consistent position prevails, the FAA does not apply in 
state courts.74  That presents an awkward situation, for the law would change 
with the change of forum.75  For example, cases not removed from Missouri 
 
 67. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 68. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 5(a). 
 69. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(a)(4)(B). 
 70. Id. § 2(b)(2). 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). 
 72. Id. § 1332(d)(3)–(4). 
 73. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2; see also Steven M. Puiszis, Developing Trends 
with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 130 (2006) (“CAFA 
was intended to expand federal jurisdiction over ‘large’ class actions . . . .”). 
 74. See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text. 
 75. See Kenneth F. Dunham, Sailing Around Erie: The Emergence of a Federal General 
Common Law of Arbitration, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 197, 206 n.68 (2006) (discussing Berhardt 
v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), which applied Erie doctrine to the question 
of whether to compel arbitration and remanded to determine which state law to apply to the 
question).  This would create a twist on Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which held that in federal 
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courts to federal courts would enforce Missouri’s Uniform Arbitration Act 
provision, discussed above, which does not enforce arbitration clauses in 
contracts of adhesion and requires that contracts with arbitration provisions 
have a ten-point-type, all-capital-letter warning that arbitration may be 
required.76  If such a case were removed to federal court under the Class 
Action Fairness Act, neither of those restrictions would apply.77  The result 
may well be that litigants in the federal court would be compelled to arbitrate, 
and litigants in state court would not.  That does not seem tidy, as equitable 
administration of law goes, but it may simply be a result of Congress’s 
recognition that certain class actions—with minimal diversity and more than 
five million dollars in controversy78—can be considered of “national 
importance,”79 while other actions, including those where the federal judge 
chooses to decline jurisdiction and remand to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d)(3), can be considered merely local in nature.80  This division of class 
actions between those that are of “national importance” and those that are 
merely local does not account for actions where the defendants do not remove 
an otherwise removable case to federal court, either for strategic reasons or for 
simple neglect. 
Although there may be differences as to the law applied in federal courts 
under the FAA and in state courts under state statutes such as the Uniform 
Arbitration Act, questions of contract defenses—as specified in section two of 
the FAA as “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract”81—ought to be uniform between federal and state courts because the 
courts in any given state are applying the same law.  Well, that’s the theory 
anyway. 
Congress apparently was under such an impression when it passed the 
Class Action Fairness Act, in which the congressional findings refer 
specifically to “bias” in the state courts.82  The “Findings and Purposes” 
section refers to fair treatment of consumers who are members of the class,83 
 
courts the law of the state governs unless the matter is governed by the Federal Constitution or by 
acts of Congress.  304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 76. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 435.350, 435.460 (2000). 
 77. See Mitchell v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 4:11cv1581 TCM, 2011 WL 6009658, at *2 & 
n.3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 1, 2011). 
 78. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). 
 79. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4)(A), 119 Stat. 4, 5 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 80. See Jeffrey L. Roether, Interpreting Congressional Silence: CAFA’s Jurisdictional 
Burden of Proof in Post-Removal Remand Proceedings, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 2760 
(2007). 
 81. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 82. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(a)(4)(B). 
 83. Id. § 2(b)(1). 
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but it seems as likely that “fairness” in the Act’s title refers to the opportunity 
for class-action defendants to escape from state courts. 
I end, as I started, with the question of whether Concepcion requires nearly 
all arbitration provisions to be enforced, or whether courts can take a case-by-
case approach under a state’s contract laws relating to defenses to contract 
formation, including unconscionability.84  Early indications are that state courts 
are reading Concepcion as allowing a case-by-case approach,85 while it is less 
clear whether the federal courts are going to take a similar approach or apply a 
 
 84. When the Court decided Concepcion, it vacated and remanded six decisions in light of 
the decision.  The following decisions on remand have not yet been reported: Gordon v. Branch 
Banking & Trust, 419 F. App’x 920, 924, 926 (11th Cir.) (holding a class-action waiver in a 
consumer contract was unconscionable where the consumer had limited viable options for relief), 
vacated sub nom., Branch Banking & Trust v. Gordon, 132 S. Ct. 577 (2011); Fensterstock v. 
Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding agreement which prevented the 
plaintiff from pursuing his claims on a class-wide basis was unconscionable under California 
law), vacated sub nom., Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc. v. Fensterstock, 131 S. Ct. 2989 (2011); 
Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 247 P.3d 130, 146, 152 (Cal.) (finding the arbitration 
provisions were substantively unconscionable and not preempted by the FAA), vacated, 132 S. 
Ct. 496 (2011).  The following decisions on remand have been reported: Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 
381 F. App’x 140, 142–43 (3d Cir. 2010) (vacating the district court’s order compelling 
arbitration and remanding for a consideration of whether the class waiver here was 
unconscionable), vacated sub nom., Cellco P’ship v. Litman, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011); Brewer v. 
Mo. Title Loans, 323 S.W.3d 18, 24 (Mo. 2010) (invalidating arbitration clause with a class-
action waiver as unconscionable), vacated sub nom., Mo. Title Loans v. Brewer, 131 S. Ct. 2875 
(2011); Herron v. Century BMW, 693 S.E.2d 394, 399–400 (S.C. 2010) (finding the provision 
prohibiting auto buyers from bringing class actions unconscionable because it violated the state’s 
law and public policy protecting auto buyers’ rights to bring class suits), vacated sub nom., Sonic 
Auto., Inc. v. Watts, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011).  On remand, the Third Circuit rejected the “New 
Jersey law holding that waivers of class arbitration are unconscionable” and thus compelled 
arbitration in Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2011).  However, the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina reinstated its vacated opinion, concluding that the FAA preemption 
issues were not preserved.  Herron v. Century BMW, 719 S.E.2d 640, 641 (S.C. 2011).  Also, the 
Missouri Supreme Court held the entire arbitration provision unconscionable and unenforceable 
under Missouri law on remand.  Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, No. SC 90647, 2012 WL 716878, at 
*10 (Mo. Mar. 6, 2012); cf., Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., No. SC 91728, 2012 WL 724669, at 
*1 (Mo. Mar. 6, 2012) (reversing trial court’s invalidation of the arbitration agreement based on a 
class-action waiver and remanding to consider the unconscionability of the arbitration agreement 
on other grounds). 
 85. See Frank Blechschmidt, All Alone in Arbitration: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and 
the Substantive Impact of Class Action Waivers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 580–81 (2012) 
(describing how courts may distinguish Concepcion on its facts and citing a New Jersey appellate 
court that “recently invalidated a class action waiver that it found to be ‘too confusing, too vague, 
and too inconsistent to be enforced,’ despite its conclusion that Concepcion controlled”); see also 
State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes of W. Va., Inc. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d 909, 920 (W. Va. 
2011)(“We believe that the circuit court was correct in finding that the arbitration provision was 
unconscionable . . . [but it] did err . . . by ruling that the existence of a class action waiver in an 
arbitration provision suggests the provision is automatically or presumptively unconscionable.”). 
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“broad and clear” understanding.86  The federal courts have not concluded that 
applying a state’s unconscionability doctrine is ipso facto an obstacle to 
enforcement of the FAA.87 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion may not have been entirely 
consistent with congressional purpose in passing the FAA in 1925,88 but it 
certainly seems consistent with the spirit of the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005.89  To state courts, this displacement of state law both in the Class Action 
Fairness Act and in Concepcion will seem to be more like usurpation than 
preemption. 
  
 
 86. B. Rush Smith III & Sean R. Higgins, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: Time to 
Consider a Motion to Compel Arbitration?, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept. 2011, at 1, 2–3 (noting that 
while the Third and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a “broad and clear” understanding of 
Concepcion, in which “a state law that seeks to impose class arbitration despite a contractual 
agreement for individualized arbitration [will be held to be] inconsistent with, and therefore 
preempted by, the FAA, irrespective of whether class arbitration is desirable for unrelated 
reasons,” other courts, such as the one in Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, have adopted a 
“case-by-case analysis of the applicable state law doctrine of unconscionability” to find that an 
arbitration agreement is unenforceable). 
 87. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011) (citation omitted) 
(“When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is 
straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.  But the inquiry becomes more 
complex when a doctrine normally thought to be generally applicable, such as . . . 
unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.”); 
Kanbar v. O’Melveny & Myers, No. C-11-0892 EMC, 2011 WL 2940690, at *6–9 (N.D. Cal. 
July 21, 2011) (finding that Concepcion did not preempt the court’s finding of unconscionability 
under California state law). 
 88. Compare Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (alteration in original) (“The ‘principal 
purpose’ of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to 
their terms.’”), with Quatman, supra note 47, at 78, and notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 4–5 (codified 
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (describing the congressional findings supporting the Act and 
outlining the purposes of the Act). 
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